A country’s defence policy must inevitably be concerned with the effective political control of geographical space, and the related ability to protect that territory from the predations of others. In Canada, that basic goal has always been confounded by the vast size of the territory to be defended — 9.985 million square kilometres of land and freshwater, with a coastline of 243,042 kilometres, the longest in the world — and by the relatively small size of a population that is strung in a thin line close to the United States. Well might Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, speaking to the House of Commons in 1936 about the difficulties of establishing sovereignty over Canada’s huge land mass, famously bemoan that “if some countries have too much history, we have too much geography.”

That vast geography plays a paradoxical role in Canadian defence policy. On the one hand, we can readily see that Canada’s “strategic geography” — defined by Andrew Pickford and Jeffrey Collins as “the relationship between physical geography and the strategic competition between states” — has played a crucial role in shaping both defence policy and strategic culture in Canada. On the other hand, however, geography is rarely mentioned as a factor when governments in Ottawa seek to conceptualize and justify defence policy. On the contrary: formal defence statements encourage Canadians to conceive of the broader strategic environment in which their country operates in what might be termed an “a-geographic” way — in other words, without reference to geography as a determinant of policy.

This chapter explores this paradox. I examine how Canada’s strategic geography has shaped defence policy from Confederation to the present, demonstrating that geographic location has always had a profound impact on Canadian security — and thus on the way that Canadians have tended to view national defence. For it is clear that most Canadians appear to understand, even if only inchoately, that when they think normatively about defence, their country’s geographical location is crucial. Judging by their political behaviour and their policy preferences over the years, Canadians have a “security imaginary” — the way in which they conceive of their country’s position in world politics — that is shaped by an appreciation of strategic geography. But in the contemporary era, we see a puzzling disjuncture. While the security imaginary of Canadians appears to be shaped by geography, their governors appear to have a different view. In the post–Cold War era, governments, both Liberal and Conservative, have conceptualized and justified Canadian defence policy a-geographically.

How to understand this disjuncture? At first blush, it might appear that the a-geographic framing by governments in Ottawa stems from a broader skepticism about the importance of place in a globalized
world. However, there is a simpler reason: ministers in cabinet have much the same view of Canada’s strategic geography as those they represent and govern. But that shared security imaginary cannot be articulated officially by a government that operates in a world where defence policy is taken much more seriously than it is in Canada; it would simply be too embarrassing. The result is that defence policy statements are purposely framed a-geographically in order to mask the realities of Canada’s strategic geography.

However, I conclude that this tendency to frame defence policy a-geographically comes at a price. A country’s strategic geography does impose imperatives — policy positions that have to be taken. For all of the security that strategic geography has afforded Canadians, one of the key imperatives created during the Cold War that Canadians could not ignore was the need to cooperate with the United States to defend against the [13] possibility of a nuclear attack by bombers from the Soviet Union. Since the end of the Cold War, Canada’s a-geographic approach to defence policy has increasingly encouraged Canadians to ignore that one key imperative created by the country’s strategic geography.

Geography and Canadian Defence Policy
A country’s strategic geography imposes unyielding and invariant parameters on its defence policy. While geography was one of the “invariants”[4] — the unchanging conditions usually beyond the capacities of governments in Ottawa to modify — identified by R.J. Sutherland in his 1962 exploration of Canada’s strategic situation, geography should more properly be thought of as relatively invariant. For while Canada’s geographic location has not changed over the years, its geostrategic location has shifted with the shifting patterns of world politics.

From Confederation in 1867 until the Second World War, Canada was physically remote from the centres of great-power rivalries, even though English-speaking Canadians were willing to participate in the wars of the British Empire of which it was a part.[5] But such engagement was always at a physical remove. As Douglas Alan Ross has put it, Canada was lucky to have “three ocean barriers plus an ‘Arctic desert’ to deter any conceivable territorial attack.”[6] War between the great powers, when it came, unfolded far from Canada, and although more than 66,000 Canadians died in the Great War, this conflict never directly threatened either Canadians or Canadian territory. Unlike smaller states in other regions that were constantly threatened by their more powerful neighbours, Canada never faced a serious national security problem from the United States. It was the physical remoteness from great-power politics that would lead Senator Raoul Dandurand to assert so iconically in 1924 that Canadians lived in a “fire-proof house, far from inflammable materials.”[7] If Canada had any strategic importance, it was the country’s ability to supply Britain with soldiers, material, and food.

The strategic importance of Canada’s geography, and the relative security afforded by its geographic isolation, changed dramatically in the late 1930s. The risk of another war in Europe prompted what David Haglund has termed a “geostrategic reorientation” in Canada,[8] marked by increasing North American defence cooperation and mutual defence assurances: in August 1938, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt promised that “the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian [14] soil is threatened by any other empire.”[9] For his part, Prime Minister King promised that Canada would ensure that “our country is made as immune from attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably be expected to make it, and that, should the occasion ever arise, enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way, either by land, sea or air to the United States, across Canadian territory.”[10]

These mutual commitments transformed Canada’s strategic geography. While the US assurances provided Canada with more security that would be possible with its own resources, it very much reshaped Canadian defence policy. King’s promise to the United States meant that Canada was no longer free to pursue a completely autonomous defence policy. If Canadians were to prove incapable of providing for their own security, the US would do it for them—whether Ottawa wanted it or not. Sutherland called this the “involuntary American guarantee”: “the United States is bound to defend Canada from external aggression almost regardless of whether or not Canadians wish to be defended.”[11] Nils Ørvik, writing in the early 1970s, had another way of conceptualizing the impact of Canada and the United States sharing the North American continent: he called it “defence against help.” Examined in more detail in the chapter
by Andrea Charron and James Fergusson, the “defence against help” dynamic held that smaller states in global politics like Canada had to maintain a certain level of defence preparedness in order to avoid “unwanted help” from larger powers whose security might be threatened by low levels of defence preparedness of their smaller neighbours.  

In this way, the mutual undertakings of August 1938 expanded Canada’s strategic geography substantially by forcing defence planners to include threats to the United States in their considerations, since according to the “defence against help” dynamic, the minimum that Canadians must devote to defence is essentially what the United States judges necessary for its own security. Thus Canada has to articulate security policies not only to deal with threats directed against itself (if there are indeed such threats), but also those threats directed against the United States.  

The shifts in strategic geography in the late 1930s were entrenched after the Second World War with the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as rival superpowers. Canada’s strategic importance shifted dramatically. No longer was it an ocean away from major-power confrontation, but directly sandwiched between the two superpowers, serving as an “American glacis.” And being a glacis imposed clear imperatives on Canada. The US military regarded the Canadian North as crucial for the defence of the American homeland against a Soviet transpolar attack. The United States wanted to ensure that surveillance and interception systems against Soviet bombers — radar stations and fighter-interceptor bases — were located as close to the Soviet Union and as far away from the American industrial heartland as possible. The result was a formal continentalization of air defence in North America: in May 1958, the two countries signed the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) agreement. Under NORAD, the United States and Canada was considered a single territory to be defended against bomber attack, with the forces of each country combined into a single binational command, with an American as the commander and a Canadian as the deputy commander. Even after the deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which could not be intercepted by jet fighters, NORAD remained integral to North American defence throughout the Cold War. The mission adapted as technology evolved, so that by the late 1970s, and the emergence of space-based detection systems, NORAD’s name was changed to the North American Aerospace Defense Command.  

The argument here is not that “geography dictated NORAD,” as C. Norman Senior mistakenly put it in 1960. Geography merely dictated that during the Cold War Canada was located physically between the two superpowers. Rather, it was politics that dictated the defence policy consequences of geographic location. First, Americans had no alternative to considering Canadian territory critical for their defence, and to wanting to use this territory to create as much distance between themselves and the Soviet Union as possible. Second, politics also explains why Canadians in the 1950s supported continentalizing air defence. While Canada was clearly an ally of the United States — putting it in 1960.  

Hence this binational command made it possible to find a political compromise acceptable to both Canadians and Americans. NORAD brought Americans the security they sought, while providing Canadians with assurance that the United States would not violate Canadian sovereignty. It also institutionalized a means for Canada to contribute to the formulation of continental defence and thus helped to legitimize full participation in a fundamentally unequal relationship. Moreover, NORAD did not impose the kind of heavy financial burden that would have been required for an entirely Canadian system of detection and interception. But once the compromise had been struck, Canada was stuck. While Ottawa could have withdrawn from NORAD, the costs of doing so would have been high. The United States would have regarded a withdrawal as an unfriendly act, with negative strategic implications. In this sense, geographic location imposed a considerable constraint on Canada: as long as the US government wanted some form of northern air defence, Canadians had the choice of participating — or facing unpalatable consequences.
With the end of the Cold War, Canada’s strategic geography shifted again, eloquent testimony to the fact that even a seemingly permanent factor like geographical location is never an absolute invariant. With the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the threat of mutual assured destruction largely evaporated, with the result that NORAD’s original raison d’être had disappeared and Canadian territory no longer had the same strategic importance to the United States. To be sure, Americans remain firmly committed to providing a surveillance and interception capability over the entire North American continent, and thus NORAD remains an active command, with the US government expecting that Canada will remain equally committed to a continentalized approach to North American security. This commitment involves patrolling the Canadian NORAD region and maintaining the Canadian portion of the North Warning System, the string of long-range and short-range radar stations strung along the mainland littoral from Cape Lisburne in western Alaska, across the north, and down the eastern edge of Baffin Island and the Labrador coast all the way to Cartwright in Newfoundland and Labrador.

But in the twenty-first century, the United States no longer needs Canadian territory for all aspects of its defence as it did in the past. While Washington hoped that Canada would participate in the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program, that hope was driven more by a desire for the political legitimacy that Canadian participation would afford BMD than by an operational need to locate the ground-based BMD weapons systems in Canada. Thus, when Ottawa persistently rejected participation in BMD, the United States was annoyed but not fussed. As the United States confronts a new threat environment that includes the possibility of an intercontinental missile strike on the American heartland from North Korea, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency continues to develop, test, and field a BMD system with [17] the various commands of the US armed forces. To make that system work, the United States does not need to site ground-based mid-course defense elements on Canadian territory.  

While Canada’s strategic importance has again shifted with the end of the Cold War, the involuntary American guarantee still holds, making Canada’s immediate “neighbourhood” fundamentally peaceable. “At present, the danger of attack upon Canada is minor in degree and second-hand in origin.” So said Mackenzie King in 1938. Today, a Canadian prime minister could readily echo that view. For while the nature and the scope of threats to global security have changed markedly over the decades, Canada’s strategic geography in the twenty-first century provides contemporary Canadians with the same kind of defence that geography provided in the first seventy years after Confederation.

**The Security Imaginary of Canadians**

These geostrategic realities are clearly reflected in how Canadians conceive of defence policy. We can infer this by looking at the political behaviour of Canadians over an extended period of time. In times of systemic peace, defence is rarely a major issue: only one general election — in April 1963 — partly turned on a defence issue.  

Voters in Canada have historically not responded to calls for greater defence expenditures in times of peace, and have never punished political parties for driving down defence spending or keeping the Canadian Armed Forces at anemic levels. Certainly voters have never meted out electoral punishment for the frequent mismanagement of the defence portfolio by the two major parties.  

On the contrary: Canadians have historically shown themselves to be what Joel Sokolsky has called “easy riders” in defence policy. In other words, Canadians do not completely “free ride” on others, but they elect governments that devote as little of Canada’s considerable wealth as possible to defence. As Sokolsky shows, over the years the easy riding calculation has come down to a simple question: what is the minimum defence spending that Canada can get away with before the country’s allies will censure Ottawa for free riding?  

The answer can be seen in the gap between what Canada and its allies spend on defence. In 2017, Canada spent CAD$27.6 (USD$21.3) billion on defence, or just 1.29% of gross domestic product (GDP), well below the NATO average of 2.42%. By contrast, Canada’s closest NATO allies spent much more: the United States spent 3.57%, Britain, 2.12%, [18] France, 1.79%. Australia is not a formal ally, but this like-minded, similarly sized Western country spent AUD$31.9 billion (USD$24.8) on defence in 2016–17, or 2.0% of GDP.
The relative stinginess of Canadians towards defence is not just a contemporary phenomenon. Historically, expenditures on defence during peacetime were always low: in the years before the First World War, in the interwar period (1919–1939), and in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. It is only during times of war — the First World War, the Second World War, the Korean War, and the Afghanistan mission — that we have seen significant spikes in spending.

What explains the Canadian propensity for easy riding in defence spending? One answer is to be found in strategic geography and how Canadians frame their security imaginary — in other words, how they conceive of their country’s position in the world, what threats to the community they imagine exist, and what responses to those threats they think are necessary. While he does not employ the theoretical lens of the security imaginary, the historian Desmond Morton provides us with a single but powerful illustration of that security imaginary at work. Writing on Canadian attitudes towards defence at the end of the Cold War, he cited a short passage from a speech to the House of Commons in 1875 by David Mills, an Ontario Liberal MP. “In a country situated as we are,” Mills told the House, “not likely to be involved in war, and having a large demand upon our resources for public improvements, it [is] highly desirable to have our military affairs conducted as cheaply as possible.”

The way Mills “imagined” security is in fact how vast numbers of Canadians have conceived of defence over the years — and continue to do so. In just thirty-nine words, Mills captured the core reasons why Canadians have the attitudes they do towards defence. Canada’s location — separated from the rest of the world by three oceans, and with a harshly inhospitable polar region on its northern approaches and the United States, a dominant and hegemonic power, as its southern neighbour — means that Canadians have the extraordinary luxury of being able to devote their wealth to things other than defence, so that whatever defence needs to be done can (and, Canadians appear to believe, should) be done on the cheap. Moreover, as Morton notes, if Canadians have neglected the armed forces in peacetime, it is because history has shown them that Canadians do not need to take defence seriously; the country has never suffered from that indifference.

Writing Defence Policy A-Geographically
If Canadians are dedicated easy riders because of their country’s strategic geography, one would never know it from the way in which their governments articulate and justify defence policy. Since the end of the Cold War, there have been four defence statements. The Liberal government of Jean Chrétien published a defence white paper in 1994; Chrétien’s Liberal successor, Paul Martin, published its International Policy Statement in 2005 that included a paper on defence; the Conservative government of Stephen Harper published the Canada First Defence Strategy in 2008; and in June 2017, the Liberal government of Justin Trudeau published Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy. It is true that in contemporary Canadian politics defence statements have a very particular and limited purpose: since 1964, the primary, if not sole, purpose of these statements has been unabashedly political — to provide a new prime minister with an opportunity to distinguish his defence policy from that of his predecessor. However, these statements also provide an important twenty-five year window into how Canadians are encouraged to think about their country’s defence.

These four statements are striking in their fundamental similarity. All embraced the idea that Canada’s defence policy had three general purposes: to defend and protect the homeland, to contribute to the defence of North America, and to contribute to international security. Each of the papers found a slightly different way to express these unchanging ideas, but the essence remained unvarying from one prime ministerial era to the next.

What is also immediately noticeable about these papers is that Canada’s geography plays no part in how governments in Canada talk about defence. The 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy makes no mention at all of geography as a determinant of defence policy. Two of the statements, when they discuss geography, limit themselves to echoing Mackenzie King’s 1936 plaint. The 1994 statement issued by the Chrétien government made explicit the difficulties of defending Canada:
Our geography is not merely vast; it is also diverse and extremely demanding. It imposes significant burdens on our military personnel, their training, and their equipment. Canada's territory encompasses mountainous terrain, fjords, vast plains, rainforests, desert conditions, and the unique ecology of the Arctic. Our climate is harsh. Indeed, the economic livelihood of many Canadians is found in remote, difficult environments including three oceans, the North, and distant mines and forests.\[30\]

A decade later, the 2005 report noted the “formidable challenge” posed by having to defend “a country as large, sparsely populated and geographically diverse as Canada, surrounded by three oceans.”\[31\]

But none of the defence policy statements mentioned the essential security provided by Canada’s geographic location. Rather, all of the papers portrayed the security threats posed to Canadians as though geographic location did not matter. The 1994 statement focused on the global instability created by refugees, “failed states,” civil wars fueled by ethnic nationalism, and the proliferation of arms, in particular weapons of mass destruction. The 2005 statement claimed that the kind of threat posed by the Soviet Union had “disappeared from view,” but had been “replaced by new and more complex threats,” including failed and failing states, humanitarian disasters, and terrorism. The 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy painted an equally foreboding picture: “Canadians live in a world characterized by volatility and unpredictability,” threatened by terrorism, ethnic conflict, resurgent nationalism and global criminal networks.\[32\] But none of the defence statements made any mention of whether geographic location had any impact on how proximate these threats were. Indeed, the 2017 paper briefly, but explicitly, rejected the idea that Canada’s geographic location might have a mitigating role on global threats. Strong, Secure, Engaged outlines numerous threats from “fragile and conflict-affected states,” economic inequality, violent extremism, mass migration arising from humanitarian emergencies, and the disruptive threats of climate change. The threats that mark the contemporary global security environment, the 2017 statement asserted, “undermine the traditional security once provided by Canada’s geography.”\[33\]

In a similar fashion, the discussions of Canada’s contribution to the defence of North America is oddly divorced from the geographical realities that had been addressed by Canadians in the 1950s. Instead, Canada’s contribution to continentalized defence is just taken for granted, justified by invoking generalized clichés about the nature of the Canada-US relationship. For example, the 1994 defence statement claimed that “Geography, history, trust and shared beliefs have also made the two countries partners in the defence of North America.”\[34\] Similar phrasing appeared in 2017: the two countries, the Trudeau government asserted, “share an unparalleled defence relationship forged by shared geography, common values and interests, deep historical connections and our highly integrated economies.”\[35\] The 2005 International Policy Statement acknowledged that increased American interest in homeland security meant that “Canada’s geography [21] is, from an American viewpoint, destined to regain the importance it lost after the end of the Cold War.”\[36\] The 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy referred to the “common defence and security requirements” that underwrote Canadian interest in defending the continent.\[37\]

In short, one would get little sense of the impact of neighbourhood on Canadian defence from reading the four post–Cold War defence reviews. One would certainly get little sense from these documents that Canada, still backed by the “involuntary American guarantee,” occupied one of the safest spaces in contemporary global politics. But, ironically, one would also get from these documents little sense of why Canada’s location in North America created very particular imperatives for Canadian defence policy. All of the defence statements cast Canadian contributions to the defence of North America as essentially voluntary and discretionary — something that Canadians might wish to do because of “shared” values, rather than something that Canadians have to do in order to avoid unwanted American “help” that would impinge on Canadian sovereignty. While it is of course understandable why a government in Ottawa would be unwilling to outline for Canadians the “defence against help” dynamic — for such a statement would challenge too directly Canadian nationalist sensibilities — it is problematic that governments, both Liberal and Conservative, would so openly encourage Canadians to think that the defence of North America was essentially voluntary and not deeply shaped by the imperatives of geography.
Explaining Ottawa’s A-Geographical Approach

The a-geographical approach embraced by Canadian governments in their formal statements on defence policy in the post–Cold War era poses a puzzle: if Canadians seem to understand that geography is central to their easy riding, why do their governors eschew discussing defence policy in geostrategic terms?

One possible answer is that this approach reflects a broader propensity to discount the impact of geography on contemporary global politics. In this view, other explanations for politics and policy seem more appropriate for a world that is marked by globalization and the compression of time and space. With the rise of rapid global communications and a globalized economy, we have seen the emergence of a common view that geographic factors — the physical location of political communities, their physical features, their resources, and their populations — are now passé. As the journalist Robert D. Kaplan put it, world politics now tends to be constructed as though “geography no longer matters.” But this is hardly a new perspective. In 1970, the futurist Alvin Toffler was suggesting that we were seeing the “demise of geography” and a concomitant “downgrading of the importance of place.” As communication became more instantaneous, it became increasingly common to argue, as the economist Frances Cairncross did, that we were experiencing the “death of distance.” And, as the processes of globalization spread in the 1980s and 1990s, it was possible to assert, as the New York Times journalist Thomas L. Friedman did, that a globalized world is an essentially “flat world” in which geography did not play a role.

Paul Dibb, one of Australia’s foremost students of geopolitics, suggests that we have seen this broader tendency applied to national defence today. While Dibb concluded that it was “far too simplistic to herald the death of geography,” he nonetheless argued that the widespread tendency to refuse to pay attention to geographic factors required that “the consistent application of strategic geography should be an iron discipline.” Moreover, the “death of geography” perspective associated with globalization at the end of the twentieth century fitted well with the broader denigration of geopolitics as an intellectual tradition that had occurred in the middle of the century. That tradition, associated with the writings of Friedrich Ratzel, Halford Mackinder, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Nicholas J. Spykman, had been discredited after one of the branches of the tradition was used by the Nazis to justify their expansionist policies. In this view, Canadian governments do not use geographic factors in conceptualizing and justifying defence policy because a geopolitical perspective has fallen out of favour.

While it might be tempting to ascribe the a-geographical approach of Canadian governments to these broader intellectual currents, a logical question arises: why would Canadian policymakers use such a different frame for defence policy than those they govern? After all, it is clear from their policy behaviour that those who ultimately approve of those government statements on defence — ministers in cabinet — have a security imaginary not at all different from those they govern. Like Canadians more generally, most individual ministers and the ministries they collectively form do not take defence policy seriously. Both Conservative and Liberal governments generally spend as little on defence as they can get away with. Ministers from both major parties appear to be quite comfortable with playing politics with defence procurement, regardless of the impact on military capability that such games produce. And it could be surmised that individual ministers come to their security imaginary like other Canadians: through a recognition that in the contemporary era Canada’s strategic geography means that they do not have to take defence seriously.

There is, I suggest, a much simpler explanation for the a-geographic approach: Canadian governments do not frame defence policy in the kind of geographic terms outlined above because it would simply be too embarrassing to do so. Bluntly put: since Canadian governments operate in a world where most states have to take defence seriously, it would be too embarrassing for Ottawa to issue a formal statement on defence policy that admitted openly that Canada’s strategic geography provides so much safety and security that Canadians can (and do) happily spend as little on defence as they can get away with. The only way to write a Canadian white paper on defence that is not embarrassing is to ignore strategic geography entirely, and frame defence policy as though geography did not matter.
Conclusion: Policy Implications

While Canadian governments eschew framing defence policy in geopolitical terms, one cannot understand Canadian defence policy outcomes unless one takes strategic geography into account. In peacetime, defence policy has been persistently marked by a lack of seriousness — reflected not only in the slim resources allocated to defence by one of the wealthiest countries in the world, but also in the persistent politicization of defence procurement by both major political parties that has not only diminished the buying power of the defence budget but has also had a negative impact on the capabilities of the Canadian Armed Forces. I have argued that the lack of seriousness on the part of elected officials reflects the lack of seriousness of the populace as a whole, and that lack of seriousness, in turn, flows inexorably from the essential safety that Canada’s strategic geography provides.

But the general Canadian unwillingness to discuss strategic geography creates a major challenge in the one area that Canadians must be serious — the imperative that Canada make a significant contribution to the defence of the North American continent. The increasing difficulty, as I have suggested elsewhere, is that since the early 1990s, governments, both Liberal and Conservative, have stopped encouraging Canadians to think of defence [24] as a partnership with the United States that is driven by strategic geography. The evanescence of a culture of defence partnership can best be seen in the persistent refusal to participate in ballistic missile defence; it can be seen in the refusal to shape procurement decisions on fighter jets around the requirements of air defence that must be implemented in partnership with the United States.

It can be argued that the a-geographic approach to defence policy outlined in this chapter accelerates this evanescence, since it encourages Canadians to treat what should be a strategic geographic imperative as something that they can (and increasingly do) regard as voluntary and discretionary. And in the fullness of time, this can only lead to tears: even though Canadians might understand why they do not have to spend like Australians on defence, there will be substantial political costs if they forget that their country’s strategic geography does create one crucial imperative that has not changed since Mackenzie King was complaining in the 1930s that Canada had too much geography.

References [pp. 25–28]


Notes [pp. 24–25]

1 House of Commons, 1936, pp. 38–68.
6 Ross, 2015, quotation at 327.
8 Haglund, 2000, quotation at 728.
9 Swanson, 1975, pp. 52–54.
10 MacTaggart, 1938, p. 1.
12 Ørvik, 1973; Barry and Bratt, 2008; Lagassé, 2010.
14 The term was applied to Canada’s position during the Cold War by Clarkson, 1995, p. 252.
In August 2004, Canada and the US agreed that NORAD could provide missile-related early warning data to US commands involved in the BMD program. Because this data is necessary for making the system work, Canada is, ipso facto, “participating” in the US-run ballistic missile defence system. Department of National Defence, 2004.

Quoted in Eayrs, 1963, pp. 672–700, quotation at 675.

See McMahon, 2009. In times of systemic war, by contrast, defence issues have featured prominently in electoral politics, notably over the issue of conscription.

Nossal, 2016.

Sokolsky, 2004, pp. 11.

NATO, 2018, table.


International Policy Statement — Defence, pp. 15.

Canada First Defence Strategy, p. 6.

Strong, Secure, Engaged, pp. 49, 14.


Strong, Secure, Engaged, p. 90.


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Kaplan, 2012, p. xix; original in italics.


Ball & Lee, 2018.

Dibb, 2006, p. 24764.

Ibid., p. 263.
